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In 2012, China approached the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal 
concerning regional cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. According to Chinese analysts, the 
rationale behind this breakthrough decision was Beijing’s acknowledgment of the growing 
importance of the region’s states within the European Union as well as a partial elimination 
of the ideological differences which had hamstrung cooperation in previous years. It seems 
that the eurozone crisis may be perceived as the reason for the CEE states’ increased interest 
in developing their cooperation with China. 
These circumstances have opened a ‘window of opportunity’ which Beijing has decided to exploit 
to create a kind of bridgehead in the region which it could later use in its further economic expan-
sion in Europe. Apart from opening the CEE region up for investments, the ‘16+1’ format was 
intended to facilitate the shaping of relations between China and the EU and to become a tool in 
building a positive image for China. Chinese experts agree that after three years of functioning, 
the ‘16+1’ regional cooperation format has helped Beijing achieve its goals only to a limited extent. 
The major obstacles have included: the immense diversification of the region, barriers related to 
EU law, insufficient expertise on the part of Chinese companies, the asymmetry of economic ne-
eds on both sides, and no willingness within the region itself to develop cooperation.
Regardless of the limited effectiveness of activities carried out so far, China has continued its 
‘16+1’ initiative. This continuation and the progressing institutionalisation of cooperation in 
the ‘16+1’ format have often seemed superficial. China has been using this multi-party formu-
la to improve its long-term bilateral relations with selected states in the region and thereby to 
create a basis for Beijing’s political and economic presence in Central-Eastern Europe.
China  on Central-Eastern Europe
In China’s view, its relations with Central-Eastern 
Europe so far have not been ranked among the 
top priorities in China’s foreign policy. After the 
fall of the Communist bloc, the former socialist 
states focused on integrating with Western in-
stitutions, and China neglected the CEE region. 
It should be noted that ‘Central-Eastern Europe’ 
is defined by China very broadly as a group of 
16 states from the former Communist bloc, which 
includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bul-
garia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia.
In 2011, China revived its cooperation with this 
group of states as a whole. Upon China’s initia-
tive an economic forum was organised in Bu-
dapest in 2011. A year later, the first meeting 
at the level of heads of government was held 
in Warsaw, marking the official launch of the 
‘16+1’ formula. Subsequent rounds of talks be-
tween prime ministers were held in Bucharest 
(2013) and Belgrade (2014). Top-level meetings 
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were complemented by a series of multilater-
al events of secondary importance, attended 
by representatives of the CEE states and Chi-
na. Various initiatives have been organised, 
including forums focused on economic and 
investment affairs as well as regional cooper-
ation. Other initiatives include: ministry-level 
conferences and other events devoted to issues 
such as tourism, education, agriculture, energy 
affairs, infrastructure development. The pro-
gressing institutionalisation of the ‘16+1’ for-
mat resulted in the establishment of a Perma-
nent Secretariat at the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
(2012), a Permanent Secretariat for Investment 
Promotion in Warsaw (2014), and several asso-
ciations and industry organisations coordinated 
by individual states (e.g. agricultural coopera-
tion is coordinated by Bulgaria, railway trans-
port – by Serbia).
How Central-Eastern Europe is viewed 
According to Chinese experts, the growing im-
portance of Central-Eastern Europe for China is 
a result of the accession of 11 countries of the 
region to the European Union. Although this 
has complicated Beijing’s cooperation with the 
region to a certain degree, the region’s EU mem-
bership has been considered a factor which fos-
ters cooperation with China. There is growing 
understanding of the fact that CEE is a part of Eu-
rope, and not of the Soviet or Eurasian area. This 
latter type of thinking is still present in a large 
portion of Chinese government institutions. It 
seems, however, that Beijing has acknowledged 
the fact that the region’s states have gained in-
fluence over decisions taken by the EU.
At the same time, CEE is seen by Chinese analysts 
mainly as the ‘outskirts’ of the European Union, 
an area of the EU’s political and economic influ-
ence. In rare cases, this view is tantamount to 
treating the EU as an external factor operating 
in the region. This seems to suggest that China’s 
knowledge of the principles of European inte-
gration is at times insufficient. According to an 
increasingly popular opinion, from the Chinese 
point of view the ‘16+1’ formula can be seen as 
an element of Beijing’s cooperation with the EU. 
Moreover, it appears that the only goal of Chi-
na’s policy towards the region is to strengthen 
Europe’s unity by offering it assistance in re-
ducing gaps in development. Chinese experts 
attach surprisingly little attention to the role 
of the United States and the ties between CEE 
states and the USA in the field of security. Very 
few experts have pointed to the rivalry of major 
powers such as the USA, Germany and Russia 
which is currently taking place in the region.
The Chinese assessment of Beijing’s relations 
with CEE states seems to be riddled with para-
doxes. On the one hand, political and ideologi-
cal differences are emphasised, as well as sepa-
rate experiences connected with the post-1989 
socio-economic transformation. This leads to 
the CEE states having a poor understanding 
of China, to cool political relations and a lack 
of enthusiasm within society for cooperation 
to be moved up a level. Some of the region’s 
states have criticised China’s approach to hu-
man rights, as well as to political, religious and 
ethical issues. These states include Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia. On the oth-
er hand, Chinese observers claim that certain 
historical ties exist between the region and the 
People’s Republic of China. These ties are said 
to have been shaped after 1949. This paradox 
can be explained by the fact that Chinese ex-
perts find it difficult to understand the mean-
ing of the changes which happened in the 
CEE region after 1989. According to them, the 
source of these changes may be associated with 
pressure exerted by Western Europe; they do 
not comprehend the internal drive for change 
in CEE countries.
The ‘16+1’ format is also intended to help 
build a positive image for China.
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China has recently acknowledged the diminish-
ing role of ideological differences. It has noticed 
that criticism targeted at it has weakened and 
that certain strategic differences in the con-
cepts promoted by Beijing and those promot-
ed by CEE countries have been eliminated. This 
shift in perception has been caused by chang-
es in the region’s geopolitical situation and the 
ongoing transformation of China itself. Addi-
tional opportunities for Beijing’s presence in 
CEE emerged as a result of the global crisis and 
the eurozone crisis. This, in turn, has resulted 
in an increased readiness among the region’s 
states to open up to cooperation with China.
CEE countries’ motives for action have been 
assessed by Chinese analysts as pragmatic. In 
most cases, CEE states are particularly inter-
ested in economic cooperation with China. 
This results from their infrastructural and cap-
ital needs and their wish to access the Chinese 
market with their exports. According to Chi-
nese experts, this approach by CEE countries 
has greatly reduced the number of states China 
could name its ‘true enthusiasts’, which treat 
Beijing as a strategic partner. This category of 
states includes Hungary and Serbia, with some 
analysts adding Romania and Estonia. One of 
the reasons for this state of affairs is the fact 
that the region’s states do not really need Chi-
na’s political support (with Serbia being one ex-
ception due to the Kosovo issue), although they 
are aware of Beijing’s growing importance in 
the international arena. Most Chinese analysts 
claim that, regardless of the strengthening of 
economic cooperation, political and social rela-
tions remain underdeveloped. This is particular-
ly evident in the case of Visegrad Group states 
(excluding Hungary) and the Baltic states. For 
Chinese analysts, Poland has been the most 
prominent example of a new EU member state 
which could become China’s partner. Accord-
ing to them, Polish-Chinese relations have been 
limited almost exclusively to trade. The level of 
cooperation in areas such as politics, diplomacy 
and mutual understanding has been assessed 
as insufficient.
Influential circles in China support the view that 
the demand for a Chinese presence in the re-
gion may be only temporary. Moreover, it is like-
ly to depend on the situation in the eurozone. 
Should a stable improvement of the economic 
situation in Western Europe come about, its 
capital involvement in CEE would be expected 
to grow. Similarly, the demand for goods made 
in Western Europe will increase. This, in turn, 
may weaken the position of Chinese investors 
and reduce the scale of involvement of local 
governments in building their countries’ rela-
tions with China. This scenario seems particu-
larly likely in the case of the Western Balkans. 
All this makes China view the current situation 
as a temporarily open ‘window of opportunity’ 
which may close should the economic situation 
in the EU improve. Chinese experts are not con-
vinced that Beijing will manage to transform 
the current opportunity into a long-term stra-
tegic presence for China in the region.
What China expects  
from the ‘16+1’ format
In this context, it is important to make an as-
sessment of the goals which originally inspired 
China to establish the ‘16+1’ format. Most Chi-
nese analysts point to four major economic and 
political motives.
CEE is one of the areas covered by the Chinese 
‘going out’ strategy which promotes foreign 
expansion among Chinese companies. The CEE 
region is considered a good place to launch an 
expansion into Western Europe and a favour-
able destination to locate investments targeted 
at the EU market. CEE is the ‘back door’ and 
Influential circles in China support the 
view that the demand for a Chinese pres-
ence in the region may be only temporary.
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a ‘testing ground’ for Chinese investments in 
the EU. The ‘16+1’ format was intended to fos-
ter favourable conditions for Chinese invest-
ments in the region, and even allegedly to help 
China bypass EU regulations.
Another political motive emphasised by Chinese 
experts has been the utilisation of the ‘16+1’ for-
mat to shape China-EU relations. The region’s 
states could become ‘lobbyists’ for Chinese in-
terests in specific EU institutions and forums.
The ‘16+1’ format is also intended to help build 
a positive image for China. As one analyst has 
put it, it is necessary to “build understanding 
for the Chinese idea of peaceful growth”. The 
new cooperation formula could help temper 
a certain aversion to China and turn around its 
negative image in the region. This negative im-
age is considered a significant barrier to the de-
velopment of political and economic relations. 
According to Chinese experts, public opinion’s 
attention should be diverted from the issue of 
China’s political system and social problems. It 
should instead be focused on the country’s eco-
nomic success and rich culture. In the context 
of foreign policy, China should be presented as 
a responsible and friendly state.
The new cooperation formula could also help 
coordinate the policy pursued by Beijing to-
wards individual Central-Eastern European 
countries and set a direction to develop bilater-
al relations further. According to some analysts, 
conducting separate effective policies towards 
a dozen or so of the region’s small states may 
be difficult.
Challenges to cooperation 
in the ‘16+1’ format
Chinese expert circles are aware of the many 
obstacles hindering the pursuit of cooperation 
in the ‘16+1’ format. 
They point to the immense diversification of the 
Central-Eastern Europe states covered by the 
‘16+1’ format (differences in the states’ potential 
and the structure of their economies, the division 
into EU member states and those outside the EU, 
into countries which belong to the eurozone and 
those which do not). This makes it practically im-
possible to devise a uniform policy towards the 
region’s states as a whole. Numerous cultural, 
historical and political differences have also been 
mentioned which prevent this group of states 
from becoming a strategic and powerful entity.
One of the most significant problems involves 
barriers connected with EU legislation, in partic-
ular those laws which restrict access to the pub-
lic procurement market. Another obstacle for 
Chinese companies is the significant share of EU 
funds in financing infrastructural investments, 
which is connected with the introduction of 
additional provisions in tender procedures. 
Moreover, restrictions concerning technical 
standards, equipment and employment rules 
make it impossible to take those methods of 
cooperation which have proved practical in Chi-
na’s relations with Asian and African countries 
and apply them to initiatives carried out with 
CEE states. The progressing integration of CEE 
states’ legislative systems with the EU system 
means that additional obstacles have begun to 
emerge even in non-EU member states.
Furthermore, Chinese entrepreneurs seem to be 
lacking knowledge and practical expertise con-
cerning the region. Many analysts point to an in-
sufficient understanding of the legal conditions 
and the characteristics of the region. This has 
contributed to the weak competitive position 
of Chinese companies. It seems that the reasons 
behind this include limited experience in con-
ducting cooperation, insufficient knowledge of 
the legal system, the specific labour and invest-
ment law and the social conditions, for example 
the mentality of the local workforce.
The Chinese debate contains arguments 
clearly suggesting the need to avoid con-
flict with the European Union.
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Another challenge is the asymmetry of the eco-
nomic needs and expectations on both sides. 
China is aware of the huge trade deficit which 
is not likely to be remedied by bilateral actions. 
The golden era of investing in the region, during 
which foreign investors were granted access to 
attractive assets covered by privatisation proj-
ects, is now over. The region’s states are current-
ly counting on greenfield investments, and some 
Chinese companies consider these too risky.
Chinese experts have strongly emphasised their 
fears concerning the possible reaction of the 
‘old’ European Union. The ‘16+1’ format has 
been strongly criticised by EU institutions and 
some of the EU’s ‘core’ states, e.g. Germany. 
Chinese analysts have pointed to the accusa-
tions concerning Beijing’s alleged attempts to 
divide the European Union and to establish 
a pro-China lobby within the EU, to foster bilat-
eral relations at the cost of China-EU relations 
and to present the EU with faits accomplis. An-
other potential threat to China’s strategy which 
it needs to identify and contain is the possibility 
the EU as a whole or some of its strong mem-
ber states acting separately to block initiatives.
Chinese experts have also emphasised the re-
gion’s internal unwillingness to cooperate. The 
states have experienced problems with coordi-
nating their own policies and at the same time 
have been unable to nominate one of them 
to perform the role of leader or intermediary. 
Commenting on the choice of Poland as the 
leader of the ‘16+1’ format, the analysts point-
ed out that a portion of the states considered 
that Warsaw is unable to assume this role and 
demanded that all the states be treated equally. 
According to one Chinese expert (Liu Zuokui), 
Poland used the meeting held in 2012 mainly to 
develop its bilateral relations with China.
Prospects for the further development 
of the ‘16+1’ format
In the Chinese debate, relatively little attention 
has been devoted to the issue of the further 
development of the ‘16+1’ cooperation format. 
What is emphasised is the need to revise the 
current view of the region and to use the expe-
rience gained in recent years.
According to Chinese analysts, the potential 
inclusion of the ‘16+1’ cooperation framework 
into the concept of the New Silk Road (“One 
Belt, One Road”) is the most promising element. 
The region is predestined to be the Road’s ‘hub’ 
and can be used during its construction, all the 
more so because the individual states and cities 
of the region have been aware of the opportu-
nities connected to it.
Chinese analysts point to the need to make co-
operation more detailed. For this to be possible, 
they propose to create separate cooperation 
platforms for specific policies. It would be rec-
ommended to make agreements at local level 
and to expand cooperation into new areas such 
as the sector of small and medium-sized en-
terprises. It would be necessary to coordinate 
measures undertaken concerning the region’s 
states. However, this would necessarily spell 
a political coordination which would be difficult 
to achieve. Considering this, Chinese experts 
recommend that greater emphasis be placed 
on the coordination of actions in the area of 
trade and investments.
Promoting mutual understanding between 
societies is also recommended. Knowledge of 
the cultural, social and political characteris-
tics of CEE will make common economic ini-
tiatives easier to apply and boost the chances 
Chinese companies have of being successful. 
At the same time, fostering an understanding 
of China’s uniqueness within CEE societies will 
Beijing has not managed to achieve 
any of the major goals of this initiative, 
establishing a launch pad on the EU mar-
ket and expanding China’s influence on 
the EU via CEE states.
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help boost support for the plans focused on 
strengthening cooperation.
A good working knowledge of the legal system 
is an element of key importance for the devel-
opment of cooperation. One of the experts (Hu 
Hao) has suggested that consulting companies 
could be established in cooperation with the 
Chinese government. Their task would be to 
help resolve these problems, reduce investment 
risk, prepare feasibility studies and analyse lo-
cal regulations. A similar role in reducing the 
risk could be played by think tanks established 
to foster bilateral cooperation, provide informa-
tion on current legislative and market changes 
and to promote cooperation itself.
Chinese experts agree that Beijing should not 
nominate any ‘preferred states’ and ‘preferred 
projects’, because this might have a negative 
impact on the development of the relations 
between China and CEE and on China’s image. 
Instead, it would be better to place an equal 
emphasis on seeking support from big and 
prestigious states and from smaller ones. This is 
particularly important in the context of capital 
investments. China should avoid applying uni-
form standards to all states, and the only fea-
sible cooperation model (which is also the cur-
rent one) is ‘one state towards many parties’.
The Chinese debate contains arguments clear-
ly suggesting the need to avoid conflict with 
the European Union. The analysts claim that 
attempts at challenging the EU’s unity and at 
‘intervening’ in the region’s affairs should in 
particular be avoided. China’s activity in CEE 
should not antagonise Brussels or the major 
European capital cities. Both Chinese experts 
and the government in Beijing emphasise that 
cooperation in the ‘16+1’ format complements 
and strengthens the “China-EU 2020 Strategic 
Agenda for Co-operation” plan.
‘16+1’: the Chinese experiment
An analysis of the Chinese discourse on Beijing’s 
cooperation with CEE countries in the ‘16+1’ 
format makes it possible to assess the sources 
and the effectiveness of China’s involvement in 
the region. Beijing has not managed to achieve 
any of the major goals of this initiative, includ-
ing in particular the goal involving a significant 
increase in its economic presence in the region, 
establishing a launch pad on the EU market and 
expanding China’s influence on the EU via CEE 
states. Despite these weaknesses, Beijing has 
continued the ‘16+1’ cooperation framework. 
There are several ways to explain this.
It is possible that China treats the choice of 
the ‘regional model’ as an experiment which 
has not been based on any specific long-term 
strategy of building multilateral relations. In 
their current form Beijing’s activities focused on 
developing relations with CEE can be assessed 
as being pragmatic. Using the ‘window of op-
portunity’, Chinese diplomats have created 
a forum for coordinating bilateral cooperation. 
This forum greatly facilitates China’s operations 
carried out in a largely diversified region. Reg-
ular summits between leaders of numerous 
small states facilitate the pursuit of bilateral 
cooperation. In this context, it is possible that 
China may be using the partly superficial multi-
lateral format to improve its bilateral relations 
with selected states of the region in the long 
term. This is suggested by the effects of subse-
quent ‘16+1’ summits held in Warsaw, Bucha-
rest and Belgrade, which resulted mainly in an 
improvement of China’s relations with the host 
states. In this way Beijing may be expanding the 
group of ‘true enthusiasts’ of cooperation and 
attempting to convince other states to include 
China in their foreign policy strategies (Hunga-
ry has already done so). It seems that building 
China may be using the partly superficial 
multilateral format to improve its bilateral 
relations with selected states of the re-
gion in the long term.
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strong bilateral political relations may prove to 
be a method for transforming the temporari-
ly open ‘window of opportunity’ into a strong 
political and economic foundation for China’s 
presence in the region. Moreover, experience 
gained this way could later be used in other re-
gions of the world.
During its further development, the ‘16+1’ for-
mat could also be used to facilitate the creation 
of the New Silk Road. The goals defined for the 
two initiatives have been largely convergent as 
they combine the pursuit of specific econom-
ic interests with the use of multilateral public 
diplomacy tools. The ‘16+1’ format could be 
used to coordinate cross-border projects in CEE 
– a region covered by the New Silk Road con-
cept. One example of this type of action is us-
ing the ‘16+1’ formula meetings in the process 
of constructing the Chinese-sponsored rail link 
between Belgrade and Budapest.
New light will be cast on the effects of coop-
eration in the region as well as on the motives 
behind China’s actions during the ‘16+1’ format 
meeting which will be held in Beijing towards 
the end of 2015. The fact that the meeting will 
take place in China will eliminate the impres-
sion of one partner being ‘favoured’ at the cost 
of others and will facilitate the assessment of 
the results of multilateral relations. At the same 
time, it will be an occasion for Beijing to test the 
degree of involvement of individual partners as 
seen in the bilateral dimension. The depth of 
this involvement will be reflected in the com-
position of official delegations formed by the 
governments of the CEE countries.
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